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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the latest results of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), a multifaceted investigation of the educational performance, and social, cultural, and psychological adaptation of children of immigrants. Since late 1991, the study has followed the progress of a sizable sample of teenage youths representing 77 nationalities in 2 areas of high immigrant population, San Diego (California) and Miami and Fort Lauderdale (Florida). The original study interviewed over 2,500 eighth and ninth graders, children of immigrants or immigrants themselves. This study summarizes the results of the latest survey, in 1995-96. The subjects come from widely varied families with many differing characteristics. Over 90% of these children of immigrants report speaking a language other than English with their parents, but they are demonstrating a rapid shift in language use and preference, with increasing fluency in English. A pattern of rapid linguistic assimilation is consistent across nationalities and socioeconomic levels. There is also a growing ethnic awareness among these children, as they are more likely to experience racial or ethnic discrimination as they grow older. They are ambitious, and less likely to drop out of school than other students. In addition, at every grade level the children of immigrants outperform school district norms, although the gap narrows over time and grade level. Predictors of academic achievement are discussed for immigrant children. Overall, the CILS results throw additional light on the adaptational changes that children of immigrants confront in their passages to adulthood. In spite of these challenges, the overall pattern is one of noteworthy achievement. An appendix compares the East Coast and West Coast populations. (Contains 8 tables and 33 references.) (SLD)

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Transformations: The Post-Immigrant Generation in an Age of Diversity

ED 419 038

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Ruben Rumbaut

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

Paper presented at the "American Diversity: Past, Present, and Future" annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society, Philadelphia, March 21, 1998. I gratefully acknowledge the support provided to the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) by research grants from the Andrew W. Mellon, Russell Sage, Spencer, and National Science Foundations to Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, Principal Investigators. The CILS project was carried out during 1991-97 in Southern California and South Florida. Lisandro Pérez was the CILS field director in South Florida. My thanks to Reynolds Farley and Rebecca Hanson of the Russell Sage Foundation for their assistance in preparing a merged data set from the 1997 and 1996 Current Population Surveys of the U. S. Bureau of the Census.

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Transformations: The Post-Immigrant Generation in an Age of Diversity

Rubén G. Rumbaut

"The problem of the children is the problem of the State. As we mould the children of the toiling masses in our cities, so we shape the destiny of the State which they will rule in their turn, taking the reins from our hands... The child is a creature of environment, of opportunity, as children are everywhere... The problems that seemed so perplexing in the light of freshly-formed prejudices against this or that immigrant, yield to this simple solution that discovers all alarm to have been groundless. Yesterday it was the swarthy Italian, today the Russian Jew, that excited our distrust. Tomorrow it may be the Arab or the Greek. All alike they have taken, or are taking, their places in the ranks of our social phalanx, pushing upward from the bottom with steady effort, as I believe they will continue to do... And in the general advance the children, thus firmly grasped, are seen to be a powerful moving force."

Jacob A. Riis, The Children of The Poor (NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892), pp. 1-8.

In at least one sense the so-called "American century" is ending much as it had begun: the United States has become anew a nation of immigrants, and it is again being profoundly transformed in the process. Central to that transformation are the modes of incorporation of today's immigrants—and more consequentially still, as Jacob Riis so vividly saw a century ago, of their offspring. Immigrant children and U.S.-born children of immigrants, the fastest growing segment of the U.S. child population, already accounted for 15% of all American children in 1990, including about 60% of all Hispanic children and an overwhelming 90% of all Asian-American children (Zhou, 1997); today, based on my analysis of the 1997 Current Population Survey,[1] they account for nearly 20% of all American children. The last census counted some 2 million foreign-born children under 18, and another 6 million U.S.-born children under 18 living with immigrant parents (Oropesa and Landale, 1997). But between 1990 and 1997 the immigrant population of the U.S. increased from 20 to 27 million, with the number of their children growing commensurately: by 1997, CPS data showed there are 3 million foreign-born children under 18, and over 10 million U.S.-born children under 18 living with at least one foreign-born parent.

[1] To obtain more reliable (if more conservative) estimates of the immigrant stock population of the U.S., the March 1997 Current Population Survey data file was augmented by unduplicated cases from the March 1996 CPS (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Demographic Files). For this analysis, "first generation" refers to the foreign-born population, and "second generation" to U.S.-born persons with at least one foreign-born parent. This definition does *not* include (1) U.S. citizens who were born, as were their parents, in Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories, and who are thus not immigrants or children of immigrants; or (2) persons born abroad to parents who are U.S. citizens.

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THE "IMMIGRANT STOCK" POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE TOP PRIMARY METROPOLITAN AREAS (PMSAs), 1997 *

	Total Population: (%)	First Generation (%)	+	Second Generation (%)	=	Immigrant Stock (%)
United States:						
Total Population:	266,726,726 100.0%	26,845,381 10.1%		27,797,013 10.4%		54,642,394 20.5%
Children under 18:	71,206,051 100.0%	2,962,089 4.1%		10,799,755 15.2%		13,761,844 19.3%
PMSAs (in rank order):						
1. Los Angeles	9,547,461 100.0%	3,526,395 36.9%		2,389,024 25.0%		5,915,419 62.0%
2. New York	8,806,186 100.0%	2,900,972 32.9%		1,880,989 21.4%		4,781,961 54.3%
3. Chicago	7,793,189 100.0%	1,081,571 13.9%		1,193,271 15.3%		2,274,842 29.2%
4. Miami	2,279,644 100.0%	1,108,618 48.6%		521,419 22.9%		1,630,037 71.5%
5. Orange County	2,775,937 100.0%	926,657 33.4%		564,787 20.3%		1,491,444 53.7%
6. San Diego	2,678,255 100.0%	650,503 24.3%		501,653 18.7%		1,152,156 43.0%
7. Houston	3,992,738 100.0%	662,654 16.6%		484,286 12.1%		1,146,940 28.7%
8. Washington, DC	4,423,737 100.0%	625,456 14.1%		374,856 8.5%		1,000,312 22.6%

* Total U.S. and PMSA population estimates from the 1997 CPS; immigrant stock estimates from the 1996-97 merged CPS. "Immigrant stock" is defined as the sum of the first and second generations of the U.S. population. In 1996-97, of the 27.8 million persons comprising the second generation, approximately two-thirds had two foreign-born parents, while one-third had one foreign-born parent and one U.S.-born parent. The immigrant stock total of 54.6 million does *not* include another 2.8 million citizens residing in the U.S. mainland who were born in Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories, as were their parents; of them, an estimated 660,772 reside in the New York PMSA.

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1997 and 1996 Annual Demographic Files, March Current Population Surveys.

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The sheer magnitude of this demographic transformation is impressive (see the detailed breakdown on the adjacent page). The "immigrant stock" of the United States today numbers about 55 million people—that is, persons who are either immigrants (26.8 million) or U.S.-born children of immigrants (27.8 million). That figure—one fifth of the national total—does not include 2.8 million others residing in the 50 states who were born (as were their parents) in Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories, nor the even larger number who reside in Puerto Rico and the other territories. If today's "immigrant stock" formed a country, it would rank in the top 10% in the world in population size—about twice the size of Canada, and roughly the size of the United Kingdom, France, or Italy.

Immigrant families, moreover, are heavily concentrated in areas of settlement. For example, fully one third of the "immigrant stock" population of the U.S. resides in California, and another third resides in Florida, Texas, and the New York-New Jersey region, with the concentrations being denser still within metropolitan areas in these states (see Rumbaut, 1994a; Farley, 1996: 151-207). The list above ranks the eight primary metropolitan areas (PMSAs) of the U.S. with immigrant-stock populations greater than one million. In Los Angeles County, an astounding 62% of the area's 9.5 million people are of immigrant stock, as are 54% of New York's and Orange County's, 43% of San Diego's, and 72% of Miami's (tops in the U.S.).

Of the 27 million foreign-born, fully 60% arrived between 1980 and 1997, and an overwhelming 90% immigrated to the U.S. since 1960. Of those post-1960 "new immigrants," the majority (52%) have come from Latin America and the Caribbean, with Mexico alone accounting for 28% of the total. Another 29% have come from Asia and the Middle East; the Filipinos, Chinese, and Indochinese alone account for 15% of the total, or as much as all of those born in Europe and Canada combined. (Africa and Oceania made up most of the remaining 4%.) This "new immigration" is thus, by definition, of very recent vintage. But it is not true that the 1965 changes in U.S. immigration law ushered in these new flows, though that oft-parroted mantra has become a cliché: the 1965 Act did open the gates to previously excluded Asian (and African) immigration, but the law had little to do with the dominant flows from the

Americas, including Mexico—the 1965 Act actually sought to restrict the flows from the Western Hemisphere—or with the huge refugee resettlement programs that were a legacy of the Indochina War specifically and of the Cold War more generally.

Immigration, as always, is mostly the province of the young. Of the more than 24 million immigrants in the U.S. today who have come since 1960, 40% arrived as children under the age of 18 (what I long ago termed the "1.5 generation" to distinguish them from both the "first generation" who immigrated as adults and the U.S.-born "second generation"), and another 40% arrived as young adults between the ages of 18 and 34. Only one in ten immigrated after the age of 40. Nearly half of the post-1960 immigrants are classified as Hispanic ethnics in the 1997 CPS, and one fourth are of Asian origin. And of the 28 million who form the U.S.-born "second generation" (defined as those with at least one foreign-born parent), about 40% are children under 18 today, and another 16% are young adults 18 to 34—mostly the offspring of the new immigrants from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. About a third, however, are over 55 years old—born before World War II to parents who had immigrated to the U.S., mostly from Europe, in the early part of this century. Of the U.S.-born second generation, close to half of those born since 1960 claim a Hispanic ethnicity, compared to only 15% of those born between 1930-1959 and 5% of those born before 1930.

The increasing size and concentration of this emerging population, added to its diverse national and socioeconomic origins and forms of adaptation, makes its evolution extraordinarily important. Yet, while the rapid growth of immigration to the United States over the last three decades has led to a mushrooming research literature and an intensified public debate about the new immigrants and their impact on American society in an age of both unprecedented diversity and widening inequality, little noticed has been the fact that a new generation of Americans raised in immigrant families has been coming of age—transforming their adoptive society even as they themselves are becoming transformed into the newest Americans. Over time, its members will decisively shape the character of their ethnic communities and their success or failure (see Portes, 1996; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996). Hence, the long-

term effects of contemporary immigration will hinge more on the trajectories of these youths than on the fate of their parents. These children of today's immigrants—a post-immigrant generation oriented not to their parents' immigrant pasts but to their own American futures—are here to stay, and they represent the most consequential and lasting legacy of the new mass immigration to the United States.

THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS LONGITUDINAL STUDY (CILS)

This paper examines the latest results of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), a multifaceted investigation of the educational performance and social, cultural and psychological adaptation of children of immigrants. It is the largest study of its kind to date in the U.S.[2] Since late 1991, the study has followed the progress of a sizable sample of teenage youths representing 77 nationalities in two key areas of immigrant settlement in the United States (see Appendix A): Southern California (San Diego) and South Florida (Miami and Fort Lauderdale). The original survey, conducted in Spring 1992 ("T1"), interviewed over 5,200 students enrolled in the 8th and 9th grades in schools of the San Diego Unified School District (N=2,420), and of the Dade and Broward County Unified School Districts (N=2,296 and 339, respectively, with another 207 enrolled in private bilingual schools in the Miami area). The sample was drawn in the junior high grades, a level at which dropout rates are still relatively rare, to avoid the potential bias of differential dropout rates between ethnic groups at the senior high school level. For purposes of the study, students were eligible to enter the sample if they were U.S.-born but had at least one immigrant (foreign-born) parent, or if they themselves were foreign-born and had come to the U.S. at an early age (most before age ten). The resulting sample is evenly balanced between males and females, and between foreign-born and U.S.-born children of immigrants—that is, respectively, between the 1.5 generation and the second generation (for details see Rumbaut, 1994b).

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[2] The CILS project has been supported by research grants from the Andrew W. Mellon, Russell Sage, Spencer, and National Science Foundations to the principal investigators, Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut. The field director for the South Florida surveys was Lisandro Pérez. For published results to date of the CILS baseline survey, see Fernández-Kelly and Schauffler, 1994; Pérez, 1994; Portes, 1995, 1996; Portes and Hao, in press; Portes and MacLeod, 1996; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; Portes and Schauffler, 1996; Rumbaut, 1994b, 1995, 1997a, 1997b.

Three years later, in 1995-96 ("T2"), a second survey of the same group of children of immigrants was conducted—this time supplemented by in-depth interviews with a stratified sample of their parents. The purpose of this follow-up effort, which succeeded in re-interviewing 82% of the baseline sample, was to ascertain changes over time in their family situation, school achievement, educational and occupational aspirations, language use and preferences, ethnic identities, experiences and expectations of discrimination, and psychosocial adjustment. By this time the youths, who were originally interviewed in junior high when most were 14 or 15 years old, had reached the final year of senior high school and were making their passages to adulthood, firming up plans for their future as well as their outlooks on the surrounding society.

This paper summarizes the results of the latest survey, focusing on changes observed over time in language, identity, ambition, and achievement, and on some implications for American society of these transformations of the post-immigrant generation in an age of diversity.

THE SAMPLE: IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR TYPES [Table 1 here]

Reflecting the geographical clustering of recent immigration, the principal nationalities represented in the San Diego CILS sample are Mexican, Filipino, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, and smaller groups of other children of immigrants from Asia (mostly Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Indian) and Latin America. In the South Florida CILS sample, the principal national-origin groups consist of Cubans, Haitians, Jamaicans, Colombians, Nicaraguans, Dominicans, and others from Latin America and the Caribbean. These groups are representative of the principal types of immigrants in contemporary American society—including immigrant laborers, professionals, entrepreneurs, and refugees with sharply contrasting socioeconomic origins, migration histories, and contexts of exit and of reception (see Rumbaut, 1994a; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996):

(1) Mexicans constitute by far the largest legal and illegal immigrant population in the U.S.—in fact, they form part of the largest, longest, and most sustained labor migration in the contemporary world--and San Diego, situated along the Mexican border, has long been a major area of settlement. The 1990 census showed that among adults over 25, Mexican immigrants had the lowest educational levels of any major U.S. ethnic group, native or foreign-born.

(2) Since the 1960s, the Filipinos have formed the second largest immigrant population in the country, and they are the largest Asian-origin immigrant nationality in California and in the U.S. Many have come as professionals (nurses most conspicuously) and through military connections (especially the U.S. Navy, making San Diego with its huge Navy base a primary area of settlement). The 1990 census showed that Filipino immigrants have the lowest poverty rate of any sizable ethnic group in the U.S.

(3) Cubans form the third largest post-1960 immigrant group in the U.S., becoming internally diversified over time from the huge first waves of political exiles of the early 1960s, to the "freedom flights" of 1965-73, the Mariel boatlift of 1980, and the *balseros* of the 1990s. Half of over one million Cubans in the U.S. are concentrated in South Florida, building one of the most visible ethnic enclaves in the country in Miami, dubbed "Havana USA" (see Portes and Stepick, 1993; Grenier and Pérez, 1996).

(4) Since the end of the Indochina War in 1975, refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have formed the largest refugee population in the U.S. The latest Current Population Surveys show that the Vietnamese are the country's fifth largest foreign-born population, following the Mexicans, Filipinos, Cubans, and the Chinese (the latter including those from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). The 1990 census found the highest poverty and welfare dependency rates in the country among Laotians (including the Hmong) and Cambodians (many of whom are survivors of the "killing fields" of the late 1970s) (see Rumbaut, 1991, 1996).

(5) Hatians and Jamaicans, who are concentrated in the New York and South Florida areas, are not only among the top recent immigrant groups in terms of size, but also form the two largest groups of "black" immigrants in the U.S. context, whose children's experiences of incorporation have underscored the salience of racial prejudice and discrimination in American life (see Stepick, 1997; Waters, 1996).

Remarkably, although the 27 million immigrants in the U.S. in 1997 came from over 150 different countries, about 40% came from only four: Mexico, the Philippines, Cuba, and Vietnam. Children of immigrants from those same four countries make up 60% of the CILS sample (see Table 1).

THE IMMIGRANT FAMILIES

[Table 2 here]

Immigrants are anything but a homogeneous lot. The modest family origins of many of these children, the highly educated backgrounds of the parents of others, patterns of homeownership, and diverse family contexts are shown in Table 2. Only a small proportion of Mexican and Indochinese fathers and mothers have college degrees, well below the 1990 U.S. norm of 20% for adults 25 and over. By contrast, 41% of Filipino mothers have college degrees, well above national norms. The contrast is made even sharper by looking at the proportion of parents with less than a high school education--that is, less than what their children have now already achieved: most of the more recently arrived foreign-born children from Mexico, Haiti, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have fathers and mothers who never completed secondary-level schooling.

Rates of labor force participation vary widely by nationality for both fathers and mothers. The Indochinese have very low rates of labor force participation, indicative of their eligibility for and use of public assistance (with the notable exception of the elite "first wave" of 1975 refugees from Vietnam), whereas most of the other groups have rates that exceed national norms. Cubans, Jamaicans, Filipinos and the "Other Asians" are most likely to have one or both parents working as professionals.

Homeownership is a telling indicator of socioeconomic advancement and spatial stability. Over half (56%) of the sample lived in families who owned their homes in 1992 (T1); three years later (T2) that proportion had edged up to 62%. But there is a huge gap between ethnic groups, ranging at T2 from a low of 4% among Hmong families from Laos and 8% of the Cambodians to over 80% of the Filipinos.

There are also significant differences in family structure among these groups, with all of the Asian-origin nationalities reflecting high proportions of intact families (over 75% of these children live with both natural parents at home), followed by the Latin American families (over 60%), while fewer than 50% of the Haitians and West Indians lived in intact families.

However, within these families the quality of parent-child relationships varies significantly. Growing up in immigrant families is often marked by linguistic and other acculturative gaps between parents and children that can exacerbate intergenerational conflicts, cause the children to feel embarrassed rather than proud of their parents as they try to fit in with native peers, or lead to role reversals, as children assume adult roles prematurely by dint of circumstance. There are sharp differences in the degree of conflict and cohesiveness among the various national-origin groups, with all of the Latin Americans reporting higher family cohesiveness and the Haitian sample reflecting the highest degree of parent-child conflict.

LANGUAGE SHIFTS [Table 3 here]

A perennial controversy in public debates on immigration concerns the role of bilingual education and perceived threats to the continuing predominance of English as the common national language. A popular new initiative on the June 1998 primary ballot in California, called "English for the Children," reflects this impulse: it would eliminate the state's bilingual programs and require that all public school instruction be conducted in English. CILS data on language preference and proficiency provide some illuminating information in this regard.

Over 90% of these children of immigrants report speaking a language other than English at home, mostly with their parents. But as seen in Table 3, at T1 already 73% of the total sample preferred to speak English instead of their parents' native tongue, including 64% of the foreign-born youth and 81% of the U.S.-born. By T2, the proportion who preferred English had swelled to 88%, including 83% of the foreign-born and 93% of the U.S.-born. Even among the most mother-tongue-retentive group—the Mexican-origin youth living in a Spanish-named city on the Mexican border with a large Spanish-speaking immigrant population and a wide range of Spanish-language radio and TV stations—the force of linguistic assimilation was incontrovertible: while at T1 only a third (32%) of the Mexico-born children preferred English, by T2 that preference had doubled to 61%; and while just over half (53%) of the U.S.-born Mexican-Americans in San Diego preferred English at T1, that proportion had jumped to four-fifths (79%) three years later. Even more decisively, among Cuban-origin youth in Miami, 95% of both the foreign-born and the native-born preferred English by T2, in both public and private schools.

A main reason for this rapid language shift in use and preference has to do with their increasing fluency in English (both spoken and written) relative to their level of fluency in the mother tongue. Respondents were asked to evaluate their ability to speak, understand, read and write in both English and the non-English mother tongue; the response format (identical to the item used in the U.S. census) ranged from "not at all" and "not well" to "well" and "very well." Over three-fourths of the total sample at both T1 and T2 reported speaking English "very well," compared to only about a third who reported an equivalent level of spoken fluency in the non-English language. Even among the foreign born, those who spoke English very well surpassed by 69% to 41% those who spoke the foreign language just as well.

And the differences in reading fluency are much sharper still: those who can read English "very well" triple the proportion of those who can read a non-English language very well (78% to 24%). The ability to maintain a sound level of literacy in a language—particularly in languages with entirely different alphabets and rules of syntax and grammar, such as many of the Asian languages brought by

immigrants to California—is nearly impossible to achieve in the absence of schools that teach it, and of a community that values it and in which it can be regularly practiced.

As a consequence, the bilingualism of these children of immigrants becomes increasingly uneven and unstable. The CILS data vividly underscore the rapidity with which English triumphs and foreign languages atrophy in the United States—even in a border city like San Diego with the busiest international border crossing in the world, or in Miami, the metropolitan area with the highest percentage of foreign-born in the country—as the second generation not only comes to speak, read and write it fluently, but prefers it overwhelmingly over their parents' native tongue. It bears adding that these results have occurred while the youths were still residing as dependents in their parents' home, where the non-English mother tongue retains primacy; once they leave the parental fold to lead independent lives of their own, the degree of English language dominance and non-English language atrophy is almost certain to accelerate, all the more among those living outside dense immigrant enclaves.

This pattern of rapid linguistic assimilation is constant across nationalities and socioeconomic levels and suggests that, over time, the use of and fluency in foreign languages will inevitably decline—results which directly rebut nativist alarms about the perpetuation of foreign-language enclaves in immigrant communities. The findings suggest that the linguistic outcomes for the third generation—the grandchildren of the present wave of immigrants—will be no different than what has been the age-old pattern in American history: the grandchildren may learn a few foreign words and phrases as a quaint vestige of their ancestry, but they will most likely grow up speaking English only. It is for this reason that the United States has been called a "language graveyard." Seen in this light, initiatives such as "English for the Children" seem superfluous. English is alive and well among the new second generation. While the public debate over English remains contentious, what is being eliminated rapidly instead are these children's ability to maintain fluency in the language of their immigrant parents, a

significant loss of scarce and valuable bilingual resources not only for the individual but for the United States in an increasingly global economy.

Indeed, as Portes and Hao (in press) observe, the rise of "global cities" in the international economy has triggered a growing need for professionals and managers able to conduct business in more than one language. Among American cities, New York and Los Angeles are prime examples of global cities and fluency in a number of languages is much in demand there. Other cities concentrate more specialized global functions. Miami, for example, has become the administrative and marketing center of the nation's Latin American trade, often dubbed the "capital" of Latin America (Portes and Stepick, 1993). Business leaders there have recently complained about the dearth of fluent Spanish bilinguals among the children of Latin immigrants—and a University of Miami study sponsored by the local Chamber of Commerce argued that young Hispanic Americans are leaving school with such insufficient Spanish-language skills that Miami's position as an international marketplace is at risk (Fradd, 1996). Although as seen in the CILS data many children of Cuban and other Latin immigrants retain some ability in the language, their Spanish is not fluent enough to be able to conduct business transactions—a situation that recently led a local businesswoman to put the matter this way: "We have 600,000 Hispanics here and we cannot find qualified people to write a letter in Spanish" (Mears, 1997; see also Navarro, 1996).

IDENTITY SHIFTS [Table 4 here]

In both surveys, an identical open-ended question was asked to ascertain the respondent's ethnic self-identity. Four main types of ethnic identities became apparent: (1) a plain "American" identity; (2) a hyphenated-American identity; (3) a national-origin identity (e.g., Filipino, Cuban, Jamaican); and (4) a pan-ethnic minority group identity (e.g., Hispanic, Latino, Chicano, Asian, Black). The way that adolescents see themselves is significant. Self-identities and ethnic loyalties can often influence patterns of behavior and outlook independent of the status of the families or the types of schools that children attend. They may also reflect social dynamics weighted with significant long-term political implications.

In 1992, a fourth of the sample (27%) identified by national origin; the largest proportion (41%) chose a hyphenated-American identification; 11% identified as plain "American;" and 17% selected pan-ethnic minority identities. Whether the youth was born in the U.S. or not made a great deal of difference in the type of identity selected: at T1, the foreign-born were four times more likely to identify by national origin (43%) than were the U.S.-born (11%); conversely, the U.S.-born were much more likely to identify as American or hyphenated-American than were the foreign-born. Those findings at T1 suggested an assimilative trend from one generation to another (see Rumbaut, 1994b, for an analysis of T1 outcomes).

But the results of the 1995 survey (conducted in the months after the passage of Proposition 187 in California) turned conventional expectations on their head. The San Diego and Miami stories diverge here. In Southern California, the biggest gainer by far in terms of the self-image of these youths was the foreign nationality identity, chosen by 32% at T1 but by 48% at T2. This shift took place among both the foreign-born and the U.S.-born, most notably among the youth of Mexican and Filipino descent—the two largest immigrant groups in the U.S.—an apparent backlash during a period (1992-96) of growing anti-immigrant sentiment and at times overt immigrant-bashing in the country, above all in California. Pan-ethnic identities remained at 16% at T2, but that figure conceals a steep decline among Mexican-origin youth in "Hispanic" and "Chicano" self-identities, and a sharp upswing in the proportion of youths now identifying pan-ethnically as "Asian" or "Asian American," especially among the smallest groups. The rapid decline of both the plain "American" (cut to less than 2%) and hyphenated-American (dropping from 43% to 30%) self-identities points to the growth of a reactive ethnic consciousness.

In South Florida, in contrast, the biggest gains overall were in pan-ethnic identities such as "Hispanic" and "Black," doubling from 17% at T1 to 38% at T2, mainly among all the Latin Americans and the Jamaicans, while the percent identifying by national origin remained unchanged at about a fifth; a plain American identity dropped sharply from 19% to less than 4% overall, and hyphenated-American identities fell to 30%. The Haitians were the sole and interesting exception in Florida: resembling the

California pattern, the proportion selecting a denationalized pan-ethnic identity decreased, while the proportions identifying as "Haitian" and "Haitian-American" increased notably—a T2 response that was given in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Haiti in the Fall of 1994, where for once the interests of the U.S. government coincided with those of the Haitian émigrés—and which in this instance again suggests the importance of the sociopolitical context in shaping ethnic self-identities.

Change over time, in any event, has not been toward assimilative mainstream identities (with or without a hyphen), but rather toward a more proudly militant or nationalistic reaffirmation of the immigrant identity for some groups (the Mexicans and Filipinos in California, the Haitians in Florida), and toward pan-ethnic minority group identities for almost all others, as these youths become increasingly aware of the ethnic and racial categories in which they are persistently classified by mainstream society—and this among a sample of children of immigrants only 13% of whom self-report racially as "white" (see the bottom panel of Table 4).[3]

In both of these variants, the results point to the rise of a "reactive ethnicity" (see Portes and Rumbaut, 1996) and to a growing identification with U.S. minority groups that, if sustained, may portend potentially significant political alignments and commitments in their adult years. In California, for instance, in boomerang fashion, real or imagined immigrant-bashing may provoke long-term opposition to politicians and political parties so perceived by the children of those immigrants in a state that will shortly become the first "majority minority" state in the country. And in Florida, the politics of race may become the most salient factor in the adult second generation.

[3] The CILS survey asked the youth to report their "race" according to a fixed response format, which included a "multiracial" option as well as "other" (in which case they were asked to specify). Fewer than half adhered to the standard categories of white (13%), black (7%), and Asian (26%), while another 12% chose "multiracial." But about half of the Cubans and other Latin Americans, and a fourth of the Mexicans, specified "Hispanic" as their race, while about half of the Mexicans and a fourth of the Filipinos listed their nationality as their race—underscoring the socially constructed character of these perceptions.

Already among first-generation adults, the past few years have seen an unprecedented increase in the number and proportion of immigrants who have applied for naturalization and who have registered to vote—with some notable and unexpected consequences, as in the 1996 election of a Hispanic newcomer, Loretta Sanchez, over former California Representative Robert Dornan in one of the nation's erstwhile most conservative congressional districts (in Orange County, between San Diego and Los Angeles, today the fifth largest metropolitan area in the U.S. in the size of its immigrant-stock population—as shown above). Whether and to what extent such future outcomes may be extrapolated from present trends remain, to be sure, open empirical questions.

DISCRIMINATION AND VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES

The process of growing ethnic awareness among the children of immigrants in the CILS sample is especially evident in their experiences and expectations of racial and ethnic discrimination (see the data in Table 4). Reports of being discriminated against increased from 54% to 62% of the sample in the last survey. Virtually every group reported more such experiences of rejection or unfair treatment against themselves as they grew older, with the highest proportions found among the children of Afro-Caribbéan and Asian immigrants, followed by Mexicans and other Latin Americans, and the lowest proportions among the Cuban youth in Miami.

Among those reporting discrimination, their own race or nationality is overwhelmingly perceived to account for what triggers unfair treatment from others. Such experiences tend to be associated over time with a higher incidence of depressive symptoms, and with the development of a distinctly more pessimistic stance about their chances to reduce discriminatory treatment through higher educational achievement. In both surveys the students were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "No matter how much education I get, people will still discriminate against me." At T1, 32% of the sample agreed with that gloomy assessment; by T2, the proportion agreeing was 35%, including substantial majorities of black immigrants from the West Indies (57%) and Haiti (64%).

Still, it is important as well to underscore the fact that despite their growing awareness of the realities of American racism and intolerance, most of the youth in the sample (almost two-thirds) continued to affirm a confident belief in the promise of equal opportunity through educational achievement. And even more tellingly, 60% of these youths agreed in the T1 survey that "there is no better country to live in than the United States," and that endorsement grew to 72% three years later—despite a growing anti-immigrant mood in the country during that period. *The groups most likely to endorse that view were the children of political exiles who found a favorable context of reception in the U.S.: the Cubans and the Vietnamese. The groups least likely to agree with that statement were also those who have most felt the weight of racial discrimination: the children of immigrants from Haiti, Jamaica and the West Indies.*

AMBITION [Table 5 here]

These children of immigrants are ambitious, as evidenced by the results shown in Table 5. When they were in the 8th and 9th grades, 67% *aspired* to advanced degrees and another 24% would not be satisfied with less than a college degree. Three years later, as the high school years came to a close, these proportions stayed exactly the same—showing the remarkable stability over time of these aspirations. The students were also asked for a "realistic" assessment of their chances of achieving those aspirations. At T1, 42% "realistically" *expected* to earn advanced degrees and another 37% would not be satisfied with less than a college degree; at T2, these proportions too stayed about the same—44% now "realistically" expected to earn advanced degrees and another 38% expected to graduate from college—again showing the resilience over time of these more realistic expectations. The proportion of those who, based on a realistic assessment, believed that they would not reach as far as a college degree dropped from 21% at T1 to 18% at T2. Given the modest family origins and material resources of many of these children, their aspirations and expectations may be disproportionate with what many will be able to achieve in the end; that too remains an open empirical question.

But ambition and a sense of purpose clearly matter. The research literature shows that high expectations are necessary for subsequent achievement. While most of these youths aim high, the least ambitious expectations are exhibited by the Mexicans, Cambodians and Laotians. Thus, there are major differences in aspirations by family socioeconomic status, and this gap is not reduced over time. Children from better off families have predictably higher and more secure plans for the future.

Even more ambitious than these children are their own parents. Asked what their parents' expectations were for their educational futures, the students felt that their parents expected them to achieve at a higher level than the students themselves aspired to. Indeed, for many immigrants that is precisely the purpose of bringing their children to the United States. At T2, while 44% of the students expected to attain an advanced degree, 65% of their parents did so; and while 18% of the children expected to stop short of a college degree, only 7% of the parents held such a low expectation. Parental expectations in turn are highly correlated with students' school performance.[4]

In contrast to the perceived parental pressure to achieve are the plans of the students' close friends—and again the types of peer groups in which the students are embedded vary in part by family socioeconomic status. The sharpest contrast in these friendship networks is seen between the Jamaicans, Filipinos and Other Asians (most of whose friends intend to attend 4-year colleges and universities) and the Mexican students (only a quarter of whom have friends who plan on attending 4-year colleges, and about 8% of whom reported at T2 that most of their close friends had already dropped out of school).

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[4] Kao and Tienda (1995), using the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS:88) data set with a sample of about 25,000 8th graders, found that the children of immigrants had higher educational aspirations than the children of native-born parents; tellingly, moreover, immigrant parents held *higher* aspirations for their children than did their own children, whereas native-born parents had *lower* aspirations for their children than did their own children. In this connection, it is worth noting two phenomena that are most probably interrelated: (1) divorced parents have lower expectations for their children's academic achievement than do non-divorced parents (*cf.* Thomson, Alexander, and Entwisle, 1988); and (2) with some significant exceptions (such as the Dominicans, Jamaicans, and Haitians), children of immigrants are generally more likely to live in intact families than are the children of the native-born, with divorce rates assimilating to native norms and increasing from the first to the second and third generations (*cf.* Jensen and Chitose, 1994; Landale and Oropesa, 1995; Rumbaut, 1994a, 1997a, 1997b).

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These social circles can exercise a powerful influence in either reinforcing or undercutting children's high aspirations and confidence in reaching them.

Still, the children of immigrants in this sample almost universally value the importance of a good education. Out of a variety of choices given in the T2 survey, 90% ranked a good education as "very important" (more than any other value), and another 85% deemed becoming an expert in one's field "very important," while less than half as many (41%) equally valued "having lots of money."[5] And these values are backed up by persistent effort and hard work: as Table 6 shows, the majority of these children of immigrants invest a substantial amount of time on daily school homework. Although wide variations are seen among the different national origin groups, at both T1 and T2 about 80% of the CILS sample reported spending more than an hour each day on homework, and over 40% spent over two hours daily on homework, well above the national U.S. average of less than an hour a day (Rumbaut, 1995, 1997a). The Asian-origin groups invest the most time on homework, while the Latin Americans invest the least.

ACHIEVEMENT [Table 6 above]

A key question raised by this study is whether the level of achievement exhibited by these children of immigrants matched, exceeded, or fell below the grade 9-12 average for the respective school districts overall—and hence how the immigrants' children compared to the children of non-immigrants. We can address this question directly with district-wide and CILS results from San Diego and Miami-Dade, focusing first on an issue of central public policy concern: school dropouts. A precise comparison of official dropout rates is possible, since the respective school systems are the same source of information for both populations and define the dropout measure equivalently.

[5] These value preferences stand in stark contrast to those of entering college freshmen in U.S. colleges in 1997. The annual UCLA nationwide poll, taken at the start of the Fall 1997 semester, found that 75% of freshmen chose being "very well off financially" as an essential goal, while only 41% chose "developing a meaningful philosophy of life"—value preferences which have switched places over the past three decades. In 1968, the survey results were the exact opposite, with only 41% of entering freshmen then selecting material affluence as an essential goal and 83% citing the importance of developing a meaningful philosophy of life. See Bronner (1998).

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A first major finding is that, in both school districts on both coasts, a significantly greater proportion of students district-wide drop out of school than do the youth from immigrant families. As the following breakdown by race-ethnicity[6] and gender shows, the multi-year dropout rate for grades 9-12 in the Miami-Dade public schools was 17.6 percent, or about double the rate of 8.9% for the entire original CILS sample of children of immigrants there—that is, of the 2,296 Miami-Dade public school students who were originally interviewed in 1992 in the 8th and 9th grades, 8.9% were officially determined to have dropped out of school at any point by 1996. On the other coast, the differential was even greater: the multi-year dropout rate for grades 9-12 in the San Diego schools was 16.2 percent, nearly triple the rate of 5.7% for the CILS sample there—that is, of the 2,420 students who were originally interviewed in 1992 in the 8th and 9th grades, only 5.7% were officially determined to have dropped out of school at any point by 1996. And since the district-wide figures by definition include all students—both the children of immigrants and of non-immigrants—the comparison shown here is most probably a conservative estimate of the extent to which the children of immigrants are more apt to stay in school overall.

Multi-year (Grades 9-12) Dropout Rates, Miami-Dade and San Diego School Districts, by Race-Ethnicity and Gender: All Students District-wide vs. Children of Immigrants (CILS)

	Total	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Male	Female
Miami-Dade Schools: All Students:	17.6	13.6	20.2	17.8	8.7	19.7	15.3
Children of Immigrants (CILS):	8.9	7.8	7.5	9.2	6.5	9.5	8.4
San Diego Schools: All Students:	16.2	10.5	17.8	26.5	9.9	17.1	15.4
Children of Immigrants (CILS):	5.7	**	**	8.7	4.5	5.9	5.6

(** Too few cases of non-Hispanic white and black children of immigrants in San Diego CILS sample for reliable rates.)

[6] Race-ethnicity as classified by the Dade County and San Diego City Schools. These one-size-fits-all Procrustean categories unfortunately combine students regardless of nativity, national origin, or generation in the U.S. Thus, the various national origin groups in the CILS sample have been aggregated here equivalently for comparative purposes. The multi-year (or longitudinal) dropout rate for grades 9-12 measures the percentage of students enrolled in the 9th grade who dropped out of school before finishing high school four years later.

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The CILS dropout rates were also noticeably lower than the district-wide rates for preponderantly native non-Hispanic white high school students (13.6% in Miami-Dade, and 10.5% in San Diego). As the results above show, lower dropout rates for children of immigrants were seen for both males and females, and for every racial-ethnic category. In Miami-Dade, the highest dropout rate in the district was found among non-Hispanic black students (20.2%), but the rate among Haitian, Jamaican and other West Indian children of immigrants was only 7.5%. In San Diego, among the students from immigrant families, the highest dropout rate was 8.7% for "Hispanic" students (including a rate of 8.8% among Mexican-origin youth), but even that rate was noticeably lower than the 26.5% district norm for all Hispanics, and slightly lower than the rate for non-Hispanic whites. Finally, while in both school systems the lowest dropout rates were registered by Asian-origin students (most of whom tend to come from immigrant families), on both coasts the Asian youth in the CILS sample (all of whom are children of immigrants) had lower rates still. These findings, coming from two of the nation's largest school districts most affected by mass immigration, are remarkably consistent and in general undercut public concerns raised about the potential for an expanded multiethnic underclass in the new second generation.

Another key measure of school performance, academic grade point averages (GPAs), can be examined comparatively with district-wide data from San Diego City Schools, broken down by grade level (9-12), compared against the GPAs earned in grades 9-12 in those same schools by the entire original CILS sample during 1992-95. *The results showed that at every grade level the children of immigrants outperform the district norms, although the gap narrows over time and grade level.* Only 29% of all 9th graders in the district had GPAs above 3.0 (top students with As and Bs in their academic classes), compared to a much higher 44% of the 9th graders from immigrant families; and while 36% of 9th graders district-wide had low GPAs under 2.0 (less than a C on average), only half as many (18%) of the children of immigrants performed as poorly. Those differentials decline over time by grade level, so that the advantage by the 12th grade is reduced to a few percentage points in favor of the children of

immigrants. That narrowing of the GPA gap appears to be due primarily to the fact that, as shown above, a greater proportion of students district-wide drop out of school than do the youth from immigrant families. These results are striking, and raise yet another question: what explains them?

PREDICTORS OF ACHIEVEMENT AND AMBITION [Tables 7 and 8 here]

What set of factors was found to be most predictive of the children of immigrants' educational achievement and aspirations? The CILS longitudinal data afford an opportunity to examine the effect of variables measured at T1 when these young people were in junior high, upon selected outcomes by the end of senior high at T2 three years later. The temporal ordering of these variables is thus unambiguous.

The presentation of results is organized in a series of sequential tables (together comprising Table 7), based on three different indicators of educational outcomes reported by the school system: the latest GPA achieved, having officially dropped out of school at any point since T1, and having left the school district for whatever reason since T1 (becoming "inactive," a category which includes dropouts as well as transfers and others). In addition, a measure of educational expectations at T2 is examined as an outcome for the purpose of this analysis (the most ambitious who responded in the T2 survey that they "realistically" expected to earn an advanced degree).

The selected predictors measured in 1992 include nationality, gender, family structure, parent-child conflict, father's and mother's education and occupation, home ownership, having attended an inner-city or suburban school at T1, school classification as a LEP or FEP student, friends' dropout status and college plans, school homework hours per day, TV-watching hours per day, educational aspirations at T1, parents' educational aspirations, ethnic self-identity, and self-esteem at T1 (measured with the 10-item Rosenberg scale; see Rumbaut, 1994b).

Multivariate analyses controlling for all of these predictors simultaneously (OLS regressions for GPAs, logistic regressions for dropouts, inactives, and the measure of educational expectations) are then

provided in Table 8 to identify the strongest and most significant determinants of each of the four achievement and ambition outcomes at T2 (for related multivariate analyses of T1 educational achievement outcomes, see Portes and MacLeod, 1996; Rumbaut, 1995, 1997a). The results may be briefly highlighted as follows:

National Origin and Gender:

There are very large differences in all educational outcomes by national origin—results which portend a significant ethnic segmentation of the socioeconomic trajectories of these youths as they make their transition into the adult labor force.

The Chinese finished high school with by far the highest GPAs and the lowest dropout rates in the study, as well as very ambitious educational goals that matched those of other Asian-origin high-status immigrant groups (especially those from India, followed by the Japanese and Koreans). Exhibiting above average performance were the Vietnamese and the Filipinos, followed by Laotians and Cambodians--although the latter two groups also exhibited the lowest educational expectations for the future (they have the highest poverty rates in the U.S., though as refugees they also received substantial government assistance). Jamaicans and other West Indians had lower GPAs, and the Haitians much lower still, yet nonetheless those Afro-Caribbean groups reported well above average ambitions.

Overall, the poorest performance was registered by Latin American youth, with the lowest GPAs in the sample found among the Dominicans, and, unexpectedly, the highest dropout rates among Cuban youth in Miami public schools (10.1%), followed by Mexican-origin youth in San Diego (8.8%). The dropout rate for the Cuban youth is particularly surprising (note especially the size of the logistic regression coefficient in Table 8), given the paradox that they are a highly assimilated group of longer residence in the U.S. than most among the "new immigration," of average to above average socioeconomic backgrounds, who have experienced less discrimination than any other group in the CILS

sample, and who uniquely form a majority group in a dense and diversified immigrant enclave (half of the over one million Cubans in the U.S. are concentrated in the Miami metropolitan area alone). Among those of Latin American origin, Mexican, Dominican, and Central American children showed the lowest educational expectations, while the Cubans (notwithstanding their lower GPAs and higher dropout rates) and South Americans were the most ambitious, reflecting the socioeconomic status of their parents.

While gender makes only a small difference in terms of dropping out of school or leaving the school district, it strongly affects grades and ambitions, with females exhibiting superior performance compared to male students, as well as having a significant edge in educational expectations.

The Family—Resources and Vulnerabilities:

Children who come from intact families with both natural parents present at home clearly do much better—that is, they have higher GPAs, much lower dropout and "inactive" rates, and higher aspirations—than children being raised in stepfamilies or single-parent homes. This is even more pronounced in families with lower levels of parent-child conflict. The greater the stability of the family, both structurally *and* emotionally (in terms of the quality of parent-child interactions), the greater the educational achievement and aspirations. Low-conflict intact families exhibit the best outcomes across the board, while high-conflict non-intact families fare worst (notably in high dropout rates), although high-conflict families yield equally poor GPAs regardless of type of family structure.

In addition, youths whose parents have a college education and higher status occupations perform much better in terms of achieving high grades and remaining in school, and in aspiring to advanced degrees, than do those whose parents have lesser levels of education or who work in low-wage jobs or are not in the labor force. Similar patterns are evident for other indicators of socioeconomic status, such as homeownership and neighborhood poverty rates (or having attended inner-city schools at T1). It is scarcely surprising that a more cohesive, stable, and resourceful home environment leads to higher

educational achievement—and in all of these respects too, children of immigrants are no different from the native-born.

Fluent Bilingualism, Work Discipline, and Future Goals:

Students who had been classified as LEP (Limited English Proficient) by the schools at T1 remained significantly associated with lower academic achievement and far more modest aspirations by T2. More noteworthy, however, is the finding that FEP students (Fluent English Proficient) achieved higher GPAs and had lower dropout and inactive rates than both LEP and English-only students, confirming previous research findings on the positive link of fluent bilingualism with cognitive achievement (see Rumbaut and Ima, 1988; Rumbaut, 1995; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; Portes and Schauffler, 1996)—although, as seen earlier, the maintenance of fluent bilingualism in the second generation is likely to prove an elusive goal.

The students who had dedicated more hours to school work in junior high at T1 did significantly better in terms of educational achievement three years later—a clear illustration of the positive long-term effects of both the early inculcation of disciplined work habits and of school engagement, as well as part of the reason for the superior school performance found among these children of immigrants relative to district-wide norms. Conversely, students who spent a large number of hours in front of the television by age 14 were more prone to perform poorly in subsequent years. The generally negative effect of television on children's academic performance is illustrated by these findings.

Educational and occupational goals and values in early adolescence are themselves closely associated with remaining in school and with better educational performance. As tables 7 and 8 show, high educational aspirations at T1 were strongly and positively associated with high GPAs and ambitions at T2, and were strongly and negatively associated with dropping out of school or leaving the district, net of other factors. In addition, the higher were the parents' achievement expectations as perceived by their

children, the higher were the students' GPAs and their own ambitions, and the lower were their dropout and inactive rates. Taken together, these results show that, even among student from low socioeconomic backgrounds, and for both males and females, work discipline and a clear sense of future goals pay off handsomely in achievement dividends.

Peer Groups, Self-Esteem, and Pan-ethnic Self-identities:

More significant still is the influence of peers: the worst outcomes in all four measures at T2 were associated with having close friends who themselves had dropped out of school or had no plans for college, while conversely, the best outcomes were attained by students whose circle of friends consisted largely of college-bound peers.

Finally, other subjective factors also shaped performance outcomes. The self-esteem score at T1 remained significantly associated with all of these outcomes across the board: the lower the self-esteem score at T1, the worse their school performance three years later and the lesser their ambitions. And pan-ethnic self-identities (e.g., Chicano, Latino) selected by age 14 or 15 in junior high were linked three years later with lower GPAs, somewhat higher dropout and inactive rates, and lower aspirations (but *not* with lower self-esteem or higher depression scores). No such effects were observed for any of the other types of ethnic self-identities at T1. That finding lends support to analyses that have pointed to the defensive development in the adolescent years of "oppositional" or "adversarial" identities which, while protective of self-esteem, disparage doing well in school as "acting white" and as a betrayal of ethnic loyalty (see the papers collected in Gibson and Ogbu, 1991; Portes, 1996; Rumbaut and Cornelius, 1995).

In short, CILS results throw additional light on the adaptational challenges that children of immigrants confront in their passages to adulthood in American contexts. In some respects, the patterns are quite similar to what one would expect to find with a sample of non-immigrant, non-minority youth. But in others, these children of immigrants, overwhelmingly from Asia, Latin America and the

Caribbean, face complex circumstances that significantly add to the developmental stressors of adolescence, and exhibit wide variations among national origin groups in their vulnerabilities and resources. Despite these added challenges—or perhaps, more provocatively, because of them—the overall picture that emerges from our study thus far is one of noteworthy achievement and resilient ambition. Whether that can be sustained as these youths make their entry into the world of work and careers in a restructured U.S. economy, as they form new families of their own, and as they seek to carve out a meaningful place in the years ahead in the society of which they are the newest members, remain as yet unanswered questions.

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Appendix A.

COAST TO COAST: SAN DIEGO AND METRO MIAMI

To highlight differences between the communities where the CILS study took place, a socioeconomic profile is sketched below comparing 1990 census data for the population of the City of San Diego—the jurisdiction covered by the San Diego Unified School District—to that for the metropolitan area of Miami-Dade (covered by the Dade County Unified School District, where most of the South Florida survey was carried out; as shown in Table 1, a small sample of 339 was also surveyed in adjacent Broward County). Data for the U.S. population as a whole is provided for comparative purposes.

	City of San Diego	Metro Miami (Dade Co.)	United States
Population, 1990 Census	1,110,549	1,914,689	248,709,873
% non-Hispanic White	58.8	30.1	75.8
% Hispanic	20.1	49.2	8.8
% Black	9.3	20.7	12.0
% Asian	11.8	1.3	2.9
% Foreign-born	20.9	45.4	7.9
% non-English speakers	29.2	57.6	13.8
% High School graduates	82.3	65.0	75.2
% College degree	29.8	18.8	20.3
% Unemployment rate	6.2	7.7	6.3
% Professionals, managers	32.5	24.6	26.4
% Laborers, fabricators	8.8	13.6	14.9
% Poverty rate (persons)	13.4	18.0	13.1
% Poverty rate (families)	9.7	14.2	10.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population, United States: Social and Economic Characteristics, 1990 CP-2-1 (1993)

San Diego's school district is the nation's 8th largest, with 133,000 students enrolled K-12, drawn from the city's (1990) population of 1.1 million, the 6th largest city in the U.S. The Dade County Unified School District is the 4th largest in the country, with over 300,000 students enrolled K-12, since it draws from the much larger metropolitan Miami-Dade area. The socioeconomic profiles above characterize the populations whose children are enrolled in the two main school districts from which the children of immigrants samples were drawn. Compared to Miami-Dade (and other large cities and school districts in the country), San Diego's is comparatively a more affluent, better educated, still primarily native non-Hispanic white population, with a 4-to-1 ratio of professionals to laborers in its labor force, in contrast to a ratio of less than 2-to-1 for the Miami metropolitan area. Nearly half (45%) of the Miami area's population was foreign-born in 1990—tops in the U.S. among metropolitan areas—compared to 21% of San Diego's, and only 8% for the U.S. as a whole. Hispanics in metro Miami, who are mostly of Cuban and other Latin American origin, comprise about half (49%) of its total population, compared to a one-fifth share (20%) in San Diego, where they are overwhelmingly of Mexican origin. San Diego's Asian-origin population (12%), composed preponderantly of Filipinos and Southeast Asians, is well above the equivalent proportion of the U.S. population (less than 3%), and the even smaller proportion found in the Miami metropolitan area (only 1.3%). These proportions are mirrored in the ethnic composition of the student bodies of the respective school systems—and in the CILS sample (see Table 1).

Table 1.

The CILS Sample: National Origin of Respondents and Location in Florida or California

	Location in Florida or California			
	Miami	Ft. Lauderdale	San Diego	Total
National Origin:				
Cuba	1195	29	2	1226
Mexico	24	4	727	755
Nicaragua	336	4	4	344
Colombia	200	23	4	227
Dominican Republic	85	15	4	104
El Salvador	26	3	5	34
Guatemala	22	2	7	31
Honduras	47	1	5	53
Costa Rica	12	0	4	16
Panama	8	5	7	20
Argentina	34	2	7	43
Chile	25	4	1	30
Ecuador	23	5	7	35
Peru	31	10	4	45
Venezuela	12	3	1	16
Other South America	31	5	6	42
Haiti	144	33	1	178
Jamaica	65	82	9	156
Other West Indies	71	35	10	116
Philippines	8	3	808	819
Vietnam	5	3	362	370
Laos (Lao)	1	0	154	155
Laos (Hmong)	0	0	53	53
Cambodia	1	0	94	95
China	9	2	26	37
Hong Kong	5	4	8	17
Taiwan	2	1	15	18
Japan	0	0	29	29
Korea	1	2	20	23
India	4	3	9	16
Pakistan	8	2	1	11
Other Asia	2	0	10	12
All Others	66	54	16	136
TOTAL	2503	339	2420	5262

Table 2.

Family Socioeconomic Status, Family Structure, and Quality of Family Relationships of Children of Immigrants in Southern California and South Florida (CILS Sample), in 1992 (T1) and 1995 (T2)

Characteristics by National Origin and Time of Survey	Time	Mexico	Cuba	Other Latin America	Haiti	Jamaica, W. Indies	Filipino	Vietnam	Laos, Cambodia	Other Asia	Total
Socioeconomic Status:											
Father:	T1										
% College graduate		7.7	26.3	31.2	11.1	24.9	29.1	15.5	7.8	42.5	23.1
% Less than high school		64.8	37.6	31.2	57.8	42.3	15.7	59.7	72.8	20.6	40.7
% Not in labor force		18.9	15.7	19.5	27.4	27.9	17.3	42.3	72.1	12.5	23.8
Mother:	T1										
% College graduate		4.3	22.0	23.3	10.4	28.9	40.5	9.4	3.5	26.3	20.9
% Less than high school		72.5	28.1	30.8	58.5	21.9	19.6	67.1	83.0	25.6	40.6
% Not in labor force		43.4	28.4	26.5	24.4	16.4	12.2	56.5	80.9	34.0	32.5
Home ownership:											
% Family owns home	T1	35.4	70.1	49.3	67.4	66.2	77.2	35.8	17.3	75.0	56.1
% Family owns home	T2	43.9	72.0	59.2	77.0	71.6	81.8	36.5	22.6	80.6	61.7
Family:											
Family Structure:	T1										
% Intact family (both natural parents at home)		64.4	62.2	63.9	49.6	47.3	81.5	77.1	73.9	78.4	67.5
% Step family		12.2	13.4	14.3	18.5	17.4	8.4	4.8	5.7	6.3	11.5
% Single parent		19.9	21.2	20.0	28.1	32.8	8.3	14.5	18.7	13.8	18.4
% Other		3.5	3.2	1.8	3.7	2.5	1.8	3.5	1.8	1.9	2.6
Parent-Child Conflict:	T1										
% Low conflict		67.7	71.4	70.0	56.9	61.5	62.7	57.9	53.7	69.6	65.9
% Medium conflict		25.2	24.9	25.1	34.6	33.5	30.9	34.8	40.6	22.8	28.4
% High conflict		7.1	3.7	5.0	8.5	5.0	6.4	7.3	5.7	7.6	5.7
Embarrassed by Parents:	T1										
% Not embarrassed		88.4	75.2	79.4	66.4	82.4	73.9	63.0	66.7	52.5	75.4
% Neither		3.9	8.4	6.6	7.5	6.0	7.8	10.8	6.7	14.4	7.5
% Embarrassed		7.7	16.4	14.0	26.1	11.6	18.3	26.2	26.6	33.1	17.2

Table 3.

Language Preference and Proficiency Among Children of Immigrants in Southern California and South Florida (CILS Sample), in 1992 (T1) and 1995 (T2)

Characteristics by National Origin and Time of Survey	Time	Mexico	Cuba	Other Latin America	Haiti	Jamaica, W. Indies	Filipino	Vietnam	Laos, Cambodia	Other Asia	Total
Primary Language Spoken at Home:	T1										
% English		2.5	3.2	2.7	3.0	61.7	5.6	0.3	0.0	13.3	6.1
% Non-English		97.5	96.8	97.3	97.0	38.3	94.4	99.7	100.0	86.7	93.9
English Language:											
% Prefers English	T1	45.7	83.1	73.9	83.7	75.6	89.4	51.6	59.4	77.5	72.6
	T2	73.1	94.7	89.7	93.3	95.0	96.1	74.5	75.6	87.5	87.8
% Speaks it "very well"	T1	61.2	90.3	81.6	87.4	92.0	85.9	54.2	42.0	78.8	77.3
	T2	62.4	88.9	83.6	86.7	94.0	88.4	50.6	43.8	77.5	77.9
% Reads it "very well"	T1	55.3	82.7	74.4	81.5	90.0	87.2	50.0	34.6	75.6	72.4
	T2	62.4	88.9	83.6	86.7	94.0	88.4	50.6	43.8	77.5	77.9
Non-English Language:											
% Speaks it "very well"	T1	55.9	33.2	41.3	21.6	14.1	11.4	36.9	40.4	25.6	33.5
	T2	59.4	37.5	42.8	25.9	9.5	10.5	33.2	38.5	23.8	34.5
% Reads it "very well"	T1	41.7	24.1	30.4	9.6	14.9	9.4	14.2	4.6	10.0	21.8
	T2	48.2	30.5	33.7	8.1	10.0	8.3	13.5	5.3	10.6	24.4

Percent Preferring English Over Mother Tongue at T1 (1992) and T2 (1995)



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Table 4.

Ethnic Self-Identity, Discrimination, and Perceptions of American Society Among Children of Immigrants in Southern California and South Florida (CILS Sample), in 1992 (T1) and 1995 (T2)

Characteristics by National Origin and Time of Survey	Time	Mexico	Cuba	Other Latin America	Haiti	Jamaica, W. Indies	Filipino	Vietnam	Laos, Cambodia	Other Asia	Total
Ethnic Self-Identity:											
% "American"	T1	2.3	22.1	15.9	13.3	17.9	3.3	3.9	2.1	13.8	11.3
	T2	1.2	5.5	3.0	0.0	3.0	1.7	0.3	0.4	5.0	2.7
% Hyphenated-American	T1	30.9	53.7	20.2	38.5	27.4	59.5	47.7	33.9	46.3	41.1
	T2	28.8	46.3	13.0	43.7	8.4	36.7	31.3	21.6	22.5	30.2
% National origin	T1	17.7	14.9	26.7	31.1	42.3	30.1	41.6	54.8	30.6	27.3
	T2	41.3	15.0	26.4	37.8	34.9	55.1	51.9	57.6	18.8	35.3
% Racial/panethnic	T1	46.7	8.4	34.2	11.9	6.5	2.2	0.3	1.8	1.3	16.6
	T2	25.1	29.6	52.7	4.4	38.6	1.9	15.2	19.4	42.5	27.0
% Mixed ethnicity, other	T1	2.3	0.9	3.0	5.2	6.0	4.8	6.5	7.4	8.1	3.7
	T2	3.7	3.6	4.9	14.1	15.1	4.6	1.3	1.1	11.3	4.8
Discrimination:											
% Experienced discrimination	T1	62.5	35.3	48.0	62.7	69.5	63.9	66.3	65.0	59.7	54.3
	T2	65.6	50.1	54.4	73.1	74.7	69.0	72.6	73.3	63.1	62.0
% Expects discrimination	T1	34.5	19.1	24.3	48.9	58.5	38.1	35.3	42.6	30.2	31.6
	T2	38.4	21.8	26.4	63.8	55.6	44.2	38.4	43.1	34.4	35.0
Perceptions of U.S.:											
% U.S. is best country to live in	T1	55.3	71.7	51.4	36.3	32.8	63.3	67.0	68.2	68.8	60.2
	T2	64.5	80.7	69.2	53.7	49.7	75.7	79.4	68.6	66.9	71.5
% Prefers American ways	T1	27.2	47.0	37.2	40.7	37.3	53.0	39.8	32.5	56.9	41.5
	T2	24.9	40.5	34.7	46.7	40.3	53.9	38.4	39.2	49.4	39.7

Table 4 (continued)

Characteristics by National Origin and Time of Survey	Time	Mexico	Cuba	Other Latin America	Haiti	Jamaica, W. Indies	Filipino	Vietnam	Laos, Cambodia	Other Asia	Total
Self-reported Race*	T2										
% White		1.5	37.8	19.5	0.0	2.0	1.2	0.6	0.4	5.0	13.3
% Black		0.5	0.6	1.9	76.3	71.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.5
% Asian		0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0	5.0	61.3	90.0	87.3	73.1	26.2
% Multiracial		13.4	11.6	13.3	8.9	14.4	13.4	1.9	3.5	16.3	11.5
% Hispanic		26.2	40.3	54.9	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	23.8
% Nationality		53.8	5.6	3.8	9.6	3.5	22.4	5.8	7.4	4.4	15.1
% Other		4.3	4.1	6.2	5.2	3.0	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.3	3.6

* Responses to structured question asked in the T2 survey, "Which of the races listed do you consider yourself to be?" The response format gave only five choices: "White," "Black," "Asian," "Multiracial," or "Other;" if "Other" was checked, the respondent was asked "which race is that?" Over 40% of the respondents chose "Other," as classified above, with "Hispanic" (or, infrequently, "Latino") or specific nationalities given as races in most of these cases.

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Table 5.

Educational and Occupational Aspirations, Expectations, and Values of Children of Immigrants in Southern California and South Florida (CILS Sample), in 1992 (T1) and 1995 (T2)

Characteristics by National Origin and Time of Survey	Time	Mexico	Cuba	Other Latin America	Haiti	Jamaica, W. Indies	Filipino	Vietnam	Laos, Cambodia	Other Asia	Total
Educational Aspirations:											
% Advanced Degree	T1	50.9	72.4	72.4	73.7	73.1	73.1	61.2	46.2	73.8	67.0
	T2	48.4	72.0	69.5	67.4	75.1	71.6	68.7	51.6	74.4	66.6
% College Degree	T1	26.0	22.4	22.8	21.8	23.4	22.4	27.7	31.2	23.8	24.1
	T2	29.5	21.7	22.0	20.7	17.9	22.4	23.2	30.4	21.9	23.5
% Less than college	T1	23.1	5.2	4.7	4.5	3.5	4.4	11.1	22.6	2.5	8.9
	T2	22.0	6.2	8.5	11.9	7.0	6.0	8.1	18.0	3.8	9.9
Educational Expectations:											
% Advanced Degree	T1	30.0	51.3	45.6	52.6	51.2	40.5	39.7	19.9	50.0	42.3
	T2	24.9	51.3	46.3	55.6	55.2	44.7	48.1	19.4	65.0	43.9
% College Degree	T1	33.5	34.6	36.4	32.3	36.3	42.9	39.7	35.0	41.3	36.9
	T2	39.0	37.1	38.7	25.6	28.4	41.5	38.4	49.8	26.3	38.2
% Less than College	T1	36.5	14.1	18.1	15.0	12.4	16.6	20.5	45.1	8.8	20.8
	T2	36.1	11.6	15.0	18.8	16.4	13.9	13.5	30.7	8.8	17.9
Parents' Aspirations for Child:											
% Advanced Degree	T2	51.4	67.5	71.5	66.9	70.0	64.4	67.2	56.1	69.4	64.9
% College Degree	T2	33.1	26.5	24.4	23.3	23.5	31.5	23.2	30.6	29.4	27.8
% Less than College	T2	15.5	6.0	4.0	9.8	6.5	4.0	9.6	13.3	1.3	7.3
Values:											
% *"Very Important" to:*											
Get a good education	T2	88.6	88.6	91.0	94.8	91.5	93.5	88.4	86.9	90.6	90.2
Have lots of money	T2	39.3	36.4	34.5	42.2	45.0	46.9	46.1	54.1	41.9	41.0

Table 5 (continued)

Characteristics by National Origin and Nativity	Time	Mexico	Cuba	Other Latin America	Haiti	Jamaica, W. Indies	Filipino	Vietnam	Laos, Cambodia	Other Asia	Total
Plans of R's Friends:											
% Plan to attend 4-year college:											
None	T2	16.9	6.9	7.3	7.5	5.1	4.0	4.2	8.9	1.9	7.6
Some	T2	55.8	46.4	52.9	43.3	37.8	43.8	46.8	48.4	38.1	47.9
Many or most	T2	27.3	46.7	39.8	49.3	57.1	52.2	49.0	42.7	60.0	44.5
% Dropped out of school:											
None	T2	48.1	50.4	43.2	60.9	58.1	60.5	63.3	53.4	76.9	53.3
Some	T2	44.0	46.1	49.7	34.6	39.4	37.6	33.8	43.1	21.3	42.3
Many or most	T2	7.9	3.4	7.1	4.5	2.5	1.9	2.9	3.6	1.9	4.4

Table 6.

Time Spent on School Work and Television by Children of Immigrants in Southern California and South Florida (CILS Sample), in 1992 (T1) and 1995 (T2)

Characteristics by National Origin and Time of Survey	Time	Mexico	Cuba	Other Latin America	Haiti	Jamaica, W. Indies	Filipino	Vietnam	Laos, Cambodia	Other Asia	Total
Homework and TV:											
Homework hours daily:											
% Under 1 hour	T1	29.6	31.3	29.8	11.3	21.0	11.3	10.1	11.3	11.3	22.5
% 1 to 3 hours		59.2	54.4	54.6	59.4	48.5	59.6	58.1	60.8	61.9	56.9
% Over 3 hours		11.2	14.3	15.6	29.3	30.5	29.2	31.8	27.9	26.9	20.6
% Under 1 hour	T2	22.0	31.3	25.4	14.2	17.7	8.9	8.4	10.2	13.1	19.9
% 1 to 3 hours		61.9	51.2	54.6	60.4	52.0	55.7	49.0	62.2	43.8	54.8
% Over 3 hours		16.1	17.4	20.0	25.4	30.3	35.4	42.5	27.6	43.1	25.2
TV-watching hours daily:											
% Under 2 hours	T1	34.9	27.6	28.7	20.1	24.5	26.4	40.3	38.9	45.3	30.6
% 2 to 4 hours		37.4	35.7	34.0	26.1	33.5	43.1	41.6	41.3	32.7	37.2
% Over 4 hours		27.7	36.7	37.3	53.7	42.0	30.5	18.0	19.8	22.0	32.2
% Under 2 hours	T2	52.3	50.8	48.1	33.6	33.3	48.7	55.3	53.4	61.9	49.7
% 2 to 4 hours		31.9	31.9	31.1	29.1	36.4	34.0	30.1	34.3	25.6	32.0
% Over 4 hours		15.7	17.3	20.8	37.3	30.3	17.3	14.6	12.4	12.5	18.3

Figure 1. Percent of CILS respondents that dropped out of Miami and San Diego public schools by 1996, by ethno-national origin



Figure 2. Mean GPA of CILS respondents, 1995 (or latest), by ethno-national origin



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Table 7.

Children of Immigrants in California and Florida (CILS Sample)

T1 (1992) Predictors of T2 (1995-96) Achievement (GPA), Educational Ambition, School Dropouts and Inactives

Ethno-National Origin	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Cuba	2.20	50.93
Mexico	2.25	24.87
Nicaragua	2.21	49.47
Colombia	2.22	47.03
Dominican Republic	1.96	34.62
Central America	2.19	35.29
South America	2.41	52.80
Haiti	2.12	54.81
Jamaica	2.39	54.24
West Indies	2.34	56.63
Philippines	2.86	44.48
Vietnam	3.02	48.06
Laos	2.85	22.22
Cambodia	2.54	22.47
Hmong	2.65	6.00
Chinese	3.64	64.29
Other Asia	3.18	67.53
All others	2.73	59.79
Total	2.46	44.03

Ethno-National Origin	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Cuba	10.15	23.05
Mexico	8.80	26.40
Nicaragua	8.93	19.64
Colombia	7.61	21.32
Dominican Rep.	5.62	31.46
Central America	6.99	26.57
South America	8.77	25.15
Haiti	6.21	15.17
Jamaica	6.76	20.27
West Indies	8.64	25.93
Philippines	4.17	17.65
Vietnam	5.45	18.53
Laos	3.87	19.35
Cambodia	4.21	14.74
Hmong	3.77	16.98
Chinese	.00	4.62
Other Asia	5.95	25.00
All others	8.75	20.00
Total	7.27	21.46

Gender	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Male	2.31	38.76
Female	2.61	48.94
Total	2.46	44.03

Gender	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Male	7.55	21.84
Female	7.02	21.11
Total	7.27	21.46

Family structure, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Intact family	2.58	45.59
Step family	2.26	42.62
Single parent	2.22	41.24
Other	2.36	29.36
Total	2.46	44.04

Family structure, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Intact family	5.50	16.53
Step family	10.31	31.26
Single parent	10.11	26.95
Other	12.34	44.16
Total	7.27	21.44

Parent-child conflict, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Low conflict	2.53	48.00
Med conflict	2.39	37.29
High conflict	2.17	31.80
Total	2.46	44.07

Parent-child conflict, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Low conflict	6.69	20.18
Med conflict	8.02	22.86
High conflict	9.93	27.05
Total	7.28	21.38

Education of Father	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Less than high school	2.32	33.24
HS graduate	2.49	45.25
College graduate	2.68	60.71
Total	2.46	44.03

Education of Father	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Less than high school	7.54	22.23
High school graduate	7.39	21.83
College graduate	6.55	19.35
Total	7.27	21.46

Education of Mother	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Less than high school	2.35	32.97
HS graduate	2.45	47.19
College graduate	2.70	59.30
Total	2.46	44.03

Education of Mother	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Less than high school	7.44	22.73
High school graduate	7.73	21.90
College graduate	6.00	17.79
Total	7.27	21.46

Occupation of father, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
White-collar, entrepreneur	2.59	55.07
Blue-collar, low-wage	2.40	39.93
Not in labor force	2.37	34.26
Total	2.46	44.03

Occupation of father, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
White-collar, entrepreneur	6.49	19.96
Blue-collar, low-wage	6.79	20.58
Not in labor force	9.12	24.92
Total	7.27	21.46

Occupation of mother, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
White-collar, entrepreneur	2.55	52.90
Blue-collar, low-wage	2.39	39.01
Not in labor force	2.40	36.25
Total	2.46	44.04

Occupation of mother, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
White-collar, entrepreneur	5.94	19.82
Blue-collar, low-wage	7.30	20.12
Not in labor force	8.79	24.24
Total	7.27	21.44

Own home at T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Not own	2.34	36.52
Own	2.56	49.79
Total	2.46	44.03

Own home at T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Not own	8.28	24.58
Own	6.33	18.53
Total	7.27	21.46

Inner city or suburban school, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Suburban	2.54	48.84
Inner city	2.32	35.26
Total	2.46	44.03

Inner city or suburban school, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Suburban	6.52	19.74
Inner city	8.53	24.35
Total	7.27	21.46

School Language Status, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
English Only	2.36	51.89
FEP	2.63	40.30
LEP	2.45	23.27
Total	2.46	44.03

School Language Status, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
English Only	8.08	23.10
FEP	5.64	17.11
LEP	8.24	25.66
Total	7.27	21.46

R's friends dropped out of school	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
None	2.75	51.83
Some	2.35	36.18
Many or most	1.97	26.74
Total	2.55	44.11

R's friends dropped out of school	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
None	3.05	8.60
Some	4.21	10.05
Many or most	8.74	15.85
Total	3.81	9.56

R's friends plan to attend 4-yr college	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
None	2.05	15.09
Some	2.40	35.03
Many or most	2.79	58.73
Total	2.55	44.17

R's friends plan to attend 4-yr college	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
None	7.54	12.46
Some	3.61	9.82
Many or most	3.32	8.55
Total	3.80	9.48

Hours of daily homework, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Under 1 hr	2.03	31.70
1 to 2 hrs	2.41	41.65
2 to 3 hrs	2.71	50.30
Over 3 hrs	2.84	56.11
Total	2.46	44.09

Hours of daily homework, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Under 1 hr	8.91	25.85
1 to 2 hrs	7.93	21.18
2 to 3 hrs	6.39	20.26
Over 3 hrs	4.75	17.06
Total	7.26	21.34

Hours of daily TV watching, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Under 2 hrs	2.60	50.00
2 to 4 hrs	2.51	43.10
Over 4 hrs	2.27	39.64
Total	2.46	44.10

Hours of daily TV watching, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Under 2 hrs	7.19	24.02
2 to 4 hrs	6.67	20.12
Over 4 hrs	7.90	20.15
Total	7.23	21.36

Educational aspirations, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Less than college	1.99	8.27
Finish college	2.25	24.71
Advanced degree	2.61	55.67
Total	2.46	44.11

Educational aspirations, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Less than college	12.39	30.25
Finish college	7.97	23.90
Advanced degree	6.20	19.00
Total	7.27	21.37

Parents' educational aspirations, T2	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Less than college	2.10	15.21
Finish college	2.39	19.98
Advanced degree	2.66	57.89
Total	2.55	44.26

Parents' educational aspirations, T2	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Less than college	9.97	14.78
Finish college	4.82	11.73
Advanced degree	2.66	8.01
Total	3.82	9.58

Ethnic self-identity, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
American	2.36	52.77
Hyphenate	2.54	46.36
National-origin	2.55	44.37
Racial, panethnic	2.18	34.28
Mixed, other	2.49	31.45
Total	2.46	44.03

Ethnic self-identity, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
American	7.27	23.14
Hyphenate	7.22	19.03
National-origin	6.67	21.41
Racial, panethnic	8.28	25.76
Mixed, other	7.33	21.47
Total	7.27	21.46

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Self-esteem score, T1	GPA at T2	Percent expects an advanced degree, T2
Low (< 3.0)	2.31	31.66
Med (3-3.5)	2.45	41.44
High (> 3.5)	2.59	55.24
Total	2.46	44.21

Self-esteem score, T1	Percent dropped out of school by T2	Percent inactive (left the school district) by T2
Low (< 3.0)	9.45	23.03
Med (3-3.5)	6.84	21.68
High (> 3.5)	6.08	19.98
Total	7.27	21.43

Table 8.

T1 (1992) Predictors of T2 (1995-96) Achievement and Ambition (GPAs, Educational Expectations, Dropouts, and Inactives): Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) Sample

T1 (1992) Predictors	T2 (1995-96) Outcomes			
	GPA[1]	Ambition[2, 3]	Dropout[2]	Inactive[2]
Gender[4]	.251***	.322***	.024	.047
Age	-.056***	-.077•	.131•	.358***
Intact family	.162***	.090	-.464***	-.639***
Parent-child conflict[5]	-.086***	-.173**	.060	.117•
Parental education[6]	.043***	.218***	.111*	.064•
Parental employment[7]	-.007	.129*	-.167•	-.072
Homeowner	.119***	.110	-.112	-.131
English proficiency[8]	-.042	.193*	-.018	-.010
Daily school homework hours	.121***	.152***	-.069	-.083**
Daily TV watching hours	-.044***	-.071***	.016	-.050*
Educational aspirations	.180***	1.029***	-.253**	-.196***
Self-esteem[9]	.169***	.419***	-.321**	.038
Racial-panethnic self-identity	-.163***	-.136	.009	.114
Cuban	-.290***	.128	.493**	.164
Mexican	.002	-.333**	.171	.274*
Haitian	-.278***	.469*	.067	-.351
Jamaican	-.189**	.053	.103	-.042
Filipino	.243***	-.367***	-.349	-.013
Vietnamese	.545***	.550***	-.177	-.111
Constant	1.750***	-5.399***	-2.669*	-5.689***
Adjusted R^2	.232			
Model Chi Square (df)		876.32 (19)	91.13 (19)	236.41 (19)

[1] Unstandardized OLS coefficients.
[2] Logistic regression coefficients.
[3] Ambition: 1=expects to earn an advanced degree, 0=does not.
[4] Gender: 1=female, 0=male.
[5] Mean of three-item scale, scored 1 to 4.
[6] Index of father's and mother's level education (low = both parents are not high school graduates, high = both parents are college graduates).
[7] Index of father's and mother's labor force participation (0 = both parents not employed, 2 = both parents employed).
[8] Mean of four-item scale (self-reported ability to speak, understand, read, and write English), scored 1 to 4.
[9] Mean of ten-item Rosenberg self-esteem scale, scored 1 to 4.

Significance levels: • $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .0001$

Note: The results on dropouts and inactives are for the CILS sample in both the San Diego and Dade County public schools (N=4,716); they do not include Broward County public schools or the two private schools in the Miami area.